{"id":96,"date":"2003-10-24T16:22:13","date_gmt":"2003-10-24T20:22:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.theoreti.ca\/?p=96"},"modified":"2003-10-24T16:22:13","modified_gmt":"2003-10-24T20:22:13","slug":"more-on-judy-and-theory","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/?p=96","title":{"rendered":"More on Judy and Theory"},"content":{"rendered":"

HUMANIST archives — October 2003 (#65)<\/a> is Willard’s response to my post on theory. (See earlier blog entry on Judy the Robot and Theory.)<\/p>\n

I want to argue that a computer model can be a theory the way a book can be. Otherwise we have a problem of where and what theories are. <\/p>\n

What follows is a post I sent in response.
\n
\nWillard McCarty in Humanist 17.333 wrote:<\/p>\n

What I think Geoffrey is talking about is the practice of modelling, i.e.
\nconstructing and interatively perfecting a partial and manipulable
\nrepresentation of something for the purpose of studying it. From this it
\nfollows that a model is what results from applying a theory to a specific
\nset of circumstances in order to see if the theory works under those
\ncircumstances and what it can tell us about them. This definition of
\n“theory” accords with some current philosophy of science, esp the so-called
\n“semantic view”, for which see Ronald N. Giere among others.<\/p>\n

Willard is to kind to ascribe a coherent position to me when I was reacting to a performance. One of the directions I was headed was to assert that a computer model could be a theory the way we could say that a work of philosophy is a theory.<\/p>\n

This raises the question of what is the incarnation of a theory. Is a theory in the mind while a written work is a “statement in writing” of the theory? Where is Plato’s theory of forms now? Is it in a “text”, the _Republic_, which is different from a particular instance of that abstract text – namely the object on my shelf? Is it in the minds of those philosophers who have read Plato? Or is it a form to which the physical artefacts (and states of mind) are approximations? (This should remind us of the debate at the UVA ACH\/ALLC about “what is a text”.<\/p>\n

If we decide that certain objects called texts are theories, then I will assert that other objects like programs are also capable of being a theory. So, if I point to the _Republic_ as a theory of forms, I should be able to point to Willard’s system as a theory of personification.<\/p>\n

Which brings me back to theorizing or the practice of developing theories. The second point I want to make is that we don’t always build programs (code theories) based on ideas (mental theories). Sometimes we develop the theory by iteratively playing with what is at hand, be it a lump of wax, words on paper, code on a machine, or diagrams on napkins. The theory emerges in the artefact and in our minds simultaneously – or in dialogue. The artefact is interpreted during theorizing as a theory. For someone else the artefact could be a database – to Willard it is an encoded theory. This would answer respondents who point out that the artefact is just a machine not a theory. It is only a theory when treated that way, which is the most we can say about anything, including our mental states.<\/p>\n

Regarding performance and philosophy, I put the question to Tom Sgouros, the performer. His response was,<\/p>\n

“That is, in a general sense, I agree with you and don’t find an
\nimportant distinction between performance and philosophy, but “Judy”
\n(as opposed to Judy) doesn’t really present a consistent viewpoint on
\nthe important subjects.”<\/p>\n

He continues to say that a performance could be a work of philosophy, but his show was not intended to present a consistent view and therefore he would not claim it is such a work. Likewise we might say that certain humanities computing works are philosophy (or theory) because they are intended to present a consistent view, while others are not. In playing with a model on a computer it would become a theory when the model was consistent and not just an aggregation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

HUMANIST archives — October 2003 (#65) is Willard’s response to my post on theory. (See earlier blog entry on Judy the Robot and Theory.) I want to argue that a computer model can be a theory the way a book can be. Otherwise we have a problem of where and what theories are. What follows … Continue reading More on Judy and Theory<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-96","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-multimedia-theory"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=96"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=96"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=96"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/theoreti.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=96"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}